Automated Synthesis of Enforcing Mechanisms for Security Properties in a Timed Setting  by Matteucci, Ilaria
Automated Synthesis of Enforcing
Mechanisms for Security Properties in a
Timed Setting 1
Ilaria Matteucci
2
Istituto di Informatica e Telematica - C.N.R., Pisa, Italy
Dipartimento di Scienze Matematiche ed Informatiche, Universita` degli Studi di Siena
Abstract
In [21,22] we have presented an approach for enforcing security properties. It is based on the automatic syn-
thesis of controller programs that are able to detect and eventually prevent possible wrong action performed
by an external agent. Here, we extend this approach also to a timed setting. Under certain assumptions,
we are also able to enforce several information ﬂow properties. We show how to deal with parameterized
systems.
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1 Overview
Many approaches for the analysis of security properties have been successfully de-
veloped in the last two decades. More recently there also has been interest on
developing techniques to study how to enforce security properties. A prominent
example is the notion of security automata in [29] and some extensions proposed in
[16].
In [18,20], the authors propose a methodology based on known techniques in
concurrency and process logics theory for the formal analysis of several security
properties (including information ﬂow).
In [21,22], we have extended this line of research with a method for automatically
enforcing the desired security properties. In particular, we have shown how to secure
a system S with a possibly un-speciﬁed component, said X, through the usage of
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a controller program, said Y  X, that prevents X to express a behavior that
in cooperation with S could make the overall system violate a safety property φ.
Four diﬀerent controller operators are then deﬁned. They mimic the behavior of
security automata in [6,16].Moreover in [21,22] we present a method for synthesizing
a controller program for each of them.
The goal of this paper is to extend previous works by deﬁning controller operators
able to enforce other security properties as information ﬂow ones. Moreover, here
we deal with systems in a timed setting. Hence, this work represents a signiﬁcant
contribution to [21,22], because we not only enrich the set of security properties
that can be enforced but also we deal with the elapsing of time in a system. To this
aim we mainly use an appropriate extension of partial model checking (see [2,27]).
We show how our theory can be extended to treat with parameterized systems,
S = Pn where n is the parameter and Pn = P‖P‖ . . . ‖P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
Our logical approach is also able to deal with composition problems, that have
been considered as an interesting issue in [6].
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic theory about the
analysis of timed security properties, especially non-interference, as properties of
open systems. Section 3 explains our approach by dealing also with composition
of properties and parameterized systems. Section 4 shows a simple example and
Section 5 presents a discussion on related work. Eventually, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Background
In this section we brieﬂy recall some useful technical machinery and also a logical
approach for dealing with information ﬂow properties and security properties in
general.
2.1 A Timed variant of CCS
The CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems) language is an algebra of processes
introduced by Milner (see [23]). It is very suitable to describe concurrent and
distributed systems.
Here we present a variant of CCS that permits to deal also with the elapsing of
time. A lot of diﬀerent languages have been developed in the literature to describe
the system in a timed setting (see [3,27]). We follow a simple approach, where time
is discrete, actions are durationless and there is one special tick action to represent
the elapsing of time (see [13,27]). These are features of the so called ﬁctitious clock
approach of, e.g. [8,15,32]. A global clock is supposed to be updated whenever
all processes of the system agree on it, by globally synchronizing on action tick.
Hence, between two global synchronizations on action tick all processes proceed
asynchronously by performing durationless actions.
Let L be a set of visible actions and let τ be a special action that models an
internal computation, i.e., it is not visible by an external observer. Let (¯) : L → L
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be a complementation function such that ∀l ∈ L : l¯ = l and let f : L → L be the
relabeling function. Let Act = L ∪ {τ} ∪ {tick} be the set of actions, ranged over
by α, β, . . . and let L ∪ {τ} be ranged over by a, b, c, . . .
The syntax of timed CCS is the following:
E ::= 0 | A | α.E | E1 + E2 | E1‖E2 | E\L | E[f ]
where α ∈ Act, L ⊆ L.
The set of timed CCS processes is denoted with E , ranged over by E,F, P,Q . . .
We will often use some common syntactic simpliﬁcations, e.g., omission of trailing
0’s as well as omission of brackets on restriction on a single action. Sort(E) is used
to denote the set of actions that occurs in the term E.
Timed CCS operators have the following informal meaning:
• 0 is a process that does nothing;
• A (agent) is a set of processes names;
• α.E (preﬁx) is a process that can perform an α action and then behaves as E. In
particular tick.E represents a process willing to let one time unit pass;
• E1+E2 (choice) represents the nondeterministic choice between the two processes
E1 and E2; when both are able to perform a tick action then E1+E2 can perform
this action and reach a conﬁguration where both summand derivatives can still
be chosen;
• E1‖E2 (parallel) is the parallel composition of processes that can proceed in an
asynchronous way but they must synchronize on complementary actions to make
a communication, represented by an internal action τ . This is the core operator
for time: both components must agree on performing a tick action;
• E\L (restriction) is the process E when actions in L ∪ L are prevented;
• E[f ] (relabeling) is the process E in which every performed action αˆ is relabeled
by f ;
• i(E) (idling) allows process E to wait indeﬁnitely. At every instant of time, if
process E performs an action α then the whole system proceeds in this state,
while dropping the idling operator.
The formal semantics of timed CCS processes is described by labeled transition
system (LTS, for short). A LTS over Act is a pair (E ,T ) where T is a ternary
relation T ⊆ (E × Act × E), known as a transition relation. It is the least relation
between timed CCS processes induced by axioms and inference rules in Table 1.
Such a relation is well-deﬁned.
2.2 Strong and weak bisimulations
It is often necessary to compare processes that are expressed using diﬀerent terms
but that have the same behavior. We recall some useful relations on processes.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let (E ,T ) be an LTS of concurrent processes, and letR be a binary
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Preﬁxing:
α.E
α
−→ E
Choice:
E1
α
−→ E′1
E1 + E2
α
−→ E′1
E2
α
−→ E′2
E1 + E2
α
−→ E′2
E1
tick
−→ E′1 E2
tick
−→ E′2
E1 + E2
tick
−→ E′1 + E
′
2
Parallel:
E1
a
−→ E′1
E1‖E2
a
−→ E′1‖E2
E2
a
−→ E′2
E1‖E2
a
−→ E1‖E
′
2
E1
l
→ E′1 E2
l
→ E′2
E1‖E2
τ
→ E′1‖E
′
2
E1
tick
−→ E′1 E2
tick
−→ E′2
E1‖E2
tick
−→ E′1‖E
′
2
Restriction:
E
α
−→ E′
E\L
α
−→ E′\L
(α 	∈L∪L)
Relabeling:
E
α
−→ E′
E[f ]
f(α)
−→ E′[f ]
Idling:
E 	
tick
−→ E 	
τ
−→
i(E)
tick
−→ i(E)
E
tick
−→ E′
i(E)
tick
−→ i(E′)
E
α
−→ E′
i(E)
α
−→ E′
Table 1
Operational semantics for timed CCS.
relation over E . ThenR is called timed strong simulation, denoted by ≺t, over (E ,T )
if and only if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R we have:
• if E
a
−→ E′ then there exists F ′ s.t. F
a
−→ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R,
• if E
tick
−→ E′ then there exists F ′ s.t. F
tick
−→ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R.
A timed strong bisimulation is a relation R s.t. bothR andR−1 are timed strong
simulations. We represent with ∼t the union of all the timed strong bisimulations.
We give now the notion of observational relationsas follows. Let α 	= τ αˆ = α
and τˆ = . E
τ
⇒ E′ (or E

=⇒ E′) if E
τ
→
∗
E′ (where
τ
→
∗
is the reﬂexive and
transitive closure of the
τ
→ relation); E
αˆ
⇒ E′ if E

=⇒
αˆ
−→

=⇒ E′ 3 .Der(E) is
the set of derivatives of E, i.e., the set of processes that can be reached through
transition relations.
3 Note that it is a short notation for E
τ
⇒ Eτ
α
→ E′τ
τ
⇒ E′ where Eτ and E′τ denote intermediate states
that is not important for this framework.
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It is useful to consider the class of processes that allow time proceed, the so-called
weakly time alive processes.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A process E is directly weakly time alive iﬀ E
tick
=⇒ 4 , while it is
weakly time alive iﬀ for all E′ ∈ Der(E), E′ is directly weakly time alive.
Since E
α
−→ E′ implies Der(E′) ⊆ Der(E), it directly follows that if E is weakly
time alive, then any derived E′ of E is weakly time alive as well. Moreover, it is
worthwhile noticing that the above property is preserved by the parallel composi-
tion.
Now we deﬁne the timed weak bisimulation relation (see [24]). This equival-
ence permits to abstract to some extent from the internal behavior of the systems,
represented by the invisible τ actions.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let (E ,T ) be an LTS of concurrent processes, and letR be a binary
relation over E . Then R is called timed weak simulation, denoted by t, over (E ,T )
if and only if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R we have:
• if E
a
−→ E′ then there exists F ′ s.t. F
a
=⇒ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R,
• if E
tick
−→ E′ then there exists F ′ s.t. F
tick
=⇒ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R.
A timed weak bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are timed weak
simulations. We represent with ≈t the union of all the timed weak bisimulations.
Every timed strong simulation is also a timed weak one (see [24]).
2.3 Equational μ-calculus and Partial Model Checking in a timed setting
Equational μ-calculus is a process logic well suited for speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation
of systems whose behavior is naturally described using states changes by means of
actions. It permits to express a lot of interesting properties like safety (“nothing bad
happens”) and liveness properties (“something good happens”), as well as allows to
express equivalence conditions over LTS. In order to deﬁne recursively properties of
a given system, this calculus uses ﬁxpoint equations. Let α be in Act and X be a
variable ranging over a ﬁnite set of variables V . Given the grammar:
A ::= X | T | F | A1 ∧A2 | A1 ∨A2 | 〈α〉A | [α]A
D ::= X =ν AD | X =μ AD | 
where the symbol T means true and F means false; ∧ is the symbol for the con-
junction of formulae, i.e., A1 ∧ A2 holds iﬀ both of the formulae A1 and A2 hold,
and ∨ is the disjunction of formulae and A1 ∨ A2 holds when at least one of A1
and A2 holds. The possibility operator 〈α〉A means that “there exists a transition
labeled by α after that A holds”. The necessity operator [α]A means “for all α-
actions performed A holds”. X =μ A is a minimal ﬁxpoint equation, where A is an
assertion (i.e. a simple modal formula without recursion operator), and X =ν A is
a maximal ﬁxpoint equation. Roughly, the semantics D of the list of equations
4 This means that we are no interested to the ﬁnal state of the transition.
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D is the solution of the system of equations corresponding to D. According to this
notation, D(X) is the set of values of the variable X, and E |= D ↓ X can be
used as a short notation for E ∈ D(X). The formal semantics is in Table 2.
The following standard result of μ-calculus will be useful in the reminder of the
paper.
Theorem 2.4 ([30]) Given a formula φ it is possible to decide in exponential time
in the length of φ if there exists a model of φ and it is also possible to give an
example of such model.
Partial model checking (pmc for short) is a technique that was originally de-
veloped for compositional analysis of concurrent systems (see [2]). The intuitive
idea underlying the pmc is the following: proving that E‖F satisﬁes a formula φ
(E‖F |= φ) is equivalent to prove that F satisﬁes φ//E , that is a modiﬁed speciﬁc-
ation of φ (F |= φ//E), where //E is the partial evaluation function for the parallel
composition operator. The formula φ is speciﬁed by use the equational μ-calculus.
A useful result of partial model checking is the following.
Lemma 2.5 ([2]) Given a process E‖F and a formula φ we have: E‖F |= φ iﬀ
F |= φ//E.
The reduced formula φ//E depends only on the formula φ and on process E.
No information is required on the process F which can represent a possible enemy.
Thus, given a certain system E, it is possible to ﬁnd the property that the enemy
must satisfy to make a successful attack on the system. It is worth noticing that
partial model checking function may be automatically derived from the semantics
rules used to deﬁne a language semantics. Thus, the proposed technique is very
ﬂexible.
According to [2], when φ is simple, i.e. it is of the form X, T, F, X1 ∧ . . . ∧
Xk ∧ [α1]Y1 ∧ . . .∧ [αl]Yl, X1 ∨ . . .∨Xk ∨ 〈α1〉Y1 ∨ . . .∨ 〈αl〉Yl, then the size of φ//E
is bounded by |φ| × |E|. Referring to [1] any assertion can be transformed to an
equivalent simple assertion in linear time. Hence we can conclude that the size of
φ//E is polynomial in the size of φ and E.
A lemma similar to Lemma 2.5 holds for every timed CCS operators (see [2,27]).
The partial model checking function for parallel operator is given on Table 3.
2.4 Characteristic formulae
A characteristic formula is an equational μ-calculus formula that completely char-
acterizes the behavior of a (state in a) LTS modulo a chosen notion of behavioral
relation.
In Section 2.2 two diﬀerent behavioral relations are described. Here we deﬁne
the notion of characteristic formula for a given ﬁnite state process E w.r.t. both of
those equivalences.
Deﬁnition 2.6 ([25]) Given a ﬁnite state process E, its characteristic formula
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T′ρ = S F
′
ρ = ∅ X
′
ρ = ρ(X) A1 ∧A2
′
ρ = A1
′
ρ ∩ A2
′
ρ
A1 ∨A2
′
ρ = A1
′
ρ ∪ A2
′
ρ 〈α〉A
′
ρ = {s | ∃s
′ : s
α
→ s′ and s′ ∈ A′ρ}
[α]A′ρ = {s | ∀s
′ : s
α
→ s′ implies s′ ∈ A′ρ}
We use unionsq to represent union of disjoint environments. Let ρ be the environment (a
function from variables to values) and σ be in {μ, ν}, then σU.f(U) represents the
σ ﬁxpoint of the function f in one variable U .
ρ = [] X =σ AD
′ρ = D
′(ρunionsq[U ′/X]) unionsq [U
′/X]
where U ′ = σU.A′(ρunionsq[U/X]unionsqρ′(U)) and ρ
′(U) = D′(ρunionsq[U/X]).
It informally says that the solution to (X =σ A)D is the σ ﬁxpoint solution U
′ of
A where the solution to the rest of the lists of equations D is used as environment.
Table 2
Equational μ-calculus
w.r.t. timed weak bisimulation 5 DE ↓ XE is deﬁned by the following equation
for every E′ ∈ Der(E), α ∈ Act:
XE′ =ν (
∧
α;E′′:E′
α
→E′′
〈〈αˆ〉〉XE′′) ∧ (
∧
α
([α](
∨
E′′:E′
αˆ
⇒E′′
XE′′)))
where 〈〈αˆ〉〉 of the modality 〈αˆ〉 which can be introduce as abbreviation (see [25]):
〈〈〉〉φ
def
= X where X =μ φ ∨ 〈τ〉X 〈〈αˆ〉〉φ
def
= 〈〈〉〉〈αˆ〉〈〈〉〉φ
These derived modalities can be equivalently expressed in equational form.
The following lemma characterizes the power of these formulae.
Lemma 2.7 ([25]) Let E1 and E2 be two diﬀerent ﬁnite-state processes. If φE2 is
characteristic for E2 then:
(i) If E1 ≈t E2 then E1 |= φE2 ;
(ii) If E1 |= φE2 and E1 is ﬁnite-state then E1 ≈t E2.
Now we deﬁne the notion of characteristic formula for a ﬁnite state process E
w.r.t. timed weak simulation relation as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.8 Given a ﬁnite state process, its characteristic formula w.r.t. timed
weak simulation DE ↓ XE is deﬁned by the following equation for every E
′ ∈
Der(E), α ∈ Act:
XE′ =ν
∧
α
([α](
∨
E′′:E′
αˆ
⇒E′′
XE′′))
.
5 Note that the presence of tick actions does not inﬂuenced the deﬁnition of characteristic formula
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(D↓ X)//t = (D//t)↓ Xt
//t = 
(X =σ AD)//t = ((Xs =σ A//s)s∈Der(E))(D)//t
X//t = Xt
〈a〉A//s = 〈a〉(A//s) ∨
∨
s
a
−→s′
A//s′, if a 	= τ
〈τ〉A//s = 〈τ〉(A//s) ∨
∨
s
τ
−→s′
A//s′ ∨
∨
s
α
−→s′
〈α〉(A//s′)
〈tick〉A//s =
⎧⎨
⎩
〈tick〉A//s′ s
tick
−→ s′
F otherwise
[a]A//s = [a](A//s) ∧
∧
s
a
−→s′
A//s′, if a 	= τ
[τ ]A//s = [τ ](A//s) ∧
∧
s
τ
−→s′
A//s′ ∧
∧
s
α
−→s′
[α](A //s′)
[tick]A//s =
⎧⎨
⎩
[tick]A//s′ s
tick
−→ s′
T otherwise
A1 ∧A2//s = (A1//s) ∧ (A2//s)
A1 ∨A2//s = (A1//s) ∨ (A2//s)
T//s = T
F//s = F
Table 3
Partial evaluation function for parallel operator E‖( ) of timed CCS.
It is easy to note that the characteristic formula of a process w.r.t. timed
simulation is simpler than the formula deﬁned in the Deﬁnition 2.6. However, also
in this case we obtain an interesting result.
Lemma 2.9 Let E be a ﬁnite-state process and let φE,	t be its characteristic for-
mula w.r.t. weak simulation. Let F be a ﬁnite-state process s.t. F t E. We have
E |= φE,	t ⇔ F |= φE,	t.
2.5 Properties expressible in equational μ-calculus
The μ-calculus is a very expressive logic (see [7]). There are a lot of (security)
properties that can be expressed by the equational μ-calculus, e.g. access control
rule as “a ﬁle f can be only read and not written”, history based access control rule
as “it is not possible to open a ﬁle a if we have already open a ﬁle b”, information
ﬂow properties (as we will see in the next section) and so on.
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In order to better explain we report some very simple examples. It is possible to
ﬁnd a formula to express safety properties as, for instance, the absence of deadlock
in a system, i.e., in any state reachable from the initial one it is always possible to
perform an action: X =ν 〈 〉T ∧ [ ]X.
6 A liveness property like “a state satisfying
φ can be reached” is expressed by X =μ 〈 〉X ∨ φ.
In the following section we describe more in detail a logical approach for spe-
cifying and analyzing information ﬂow properties because in the rest of the paper
we are interested to show how it is possible to deﬁne controllers to enforce these.
2.5.1 A logical approach for specifying and analyzing security properties as inform-
ation ﬂow in a real-time setting
Information ﬂow is a main topic in the theoretical study of computer security. We
can ﬁnd several formal deﬁnitions in the literature (see [12,17,28]) for concurrent
processes. To describe this property, we can consider two users, High and Low
interacting with the same computer system. We wonder if there is any ﬂow of
information from High to Low. A central property is the Non Deducibility on Com-
position (NDC, see [12]) that has been proposed as generalization of the classical
idea of Non-Interference to nondeterministic systems: low level users cannot infer
the behavior of high level users from the system because for low level users the
system is always the same. This idea can be represented as follow:
∀Π ∈ High users E‖Π ≡ E w.r.t. Low users
(where ‖ stands for a suitable composition operator and ≡ for an equivalence rela-
tion).
The natural extension of NDC to a timed setting is timed NDC (tNDC, for
short).
We denote with tBNDC a security property called Bisimulation Non Deducib-
ility on Compositions in a timed setting (see [12]).
Before formally introducing it, we need to discuss brieﬂy on the nature of the
admissible High users. In the timed CCS model we cannot consider all high pro-
cesses for the interaction with the system. Indeed, we must restrict ourselves to
weakly time alive processes that can perform only action in ActH 7 ∪ {τ, tick}. We
call EH the set of such processes. The reason is the following: a process Π that is
not weakly time alive may prevent time from elapsing when composed in parallel
with some system E. Indeed, in a compound process, time can pass if and only
if all components let it pass. Hence, a high user which is not weakly time alive
could block the time ﬂow also for low users and we certainly want to avoid this
unrealistic (and undesirable) possibility. The tBNDC property in timed CCS can
be thus deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.10 E ∈ tBNDC if and only if ∀Π ∈ EH we have (E‖Π)\H ≈t E\H.
6 In writing properties, here and in the rest of the paper, we use the shortcut notations [ ] means [Act] and,
equivalently, 〈 〉 means 〈Act〉.
7 It is the subset of actions in which there areall the actions of an High user.
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Due to the presence of the universal quantiﬁcation, tBNDC is not very easy to
check.
Let H be the set of high users that are composed with the system when it is
checked (as done in [20]). Under certain constraints on the set H, we can provide a
method for reducing the veriﬁcation of tBNDCH membership to a validity problem
in equational μ−calculus, where by tBNDCH we denoted tBNDC for process in
H,
Deﬁnition 2.11 E ∈ tBNDCH if and only if ∀Π ∈ H : (E‖Π)\H ≈t E\H.
By using the characteristic formula for ≈t of E\H, we obtain the following
characterization: 8
E ∈ tBNDCH iﬀ ∀Π ∈ H : (E‖Π)\H |= φ≈t,E\H (1)
Now, we can apply the partial evaluation function w.r.t. E, \H to the formula
φ≈t,E\H by getting a formula φ
′. Then the previous equation is equivalent to check
that every process in H satisﬁes φ′. Indeed, the behavior of E has been evaluated
and encoded in the formula φ′. Thus:
E ∈ tBNDCH iﬀ ∀Π ∈ H Π |= φ′
We expect to have decidability results only if we restrict ourselves to ﬁnite-state
systems (see [18]). Let fs = {E|Der(E) is ﬁnite} be the set of ﬁnite state processes.
We also require that the set L of visible actions is ﬁnite. If the membership inH can
be deﬁned by a formula φ′′ then we obtain that the previous problem is equivalent
to:
E ∈ tBNDCH iﬀ ∀Π ∈ H Π |= φ′′ ⇒ φ′
The validity problem for this logic may be shown to be decidable by using the same
proof techniques of [31].
3 Enforcing security properties
Let S be a system, and let X be one component that may be dynamically changed
(e.g., a downloaded mobile agent). We say that the system S‖X enjoys a security
property expressed by a logical formula φ if and only if for every behavior of the
component X, the behavior of the system S enjoys φ, i.e.:
∀X (S‖X)\H |= φ (2)
where H is the set of high actions as before. By using the partial model checking
approach proposed in [18], we can focus on the properties of the possibly un-trusted
component X, i.e.:
∀X X |= φ//S,\H (3)
8 Actually, this is true only if we consider ﬁnite-state processes.
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Thus, we may study whether a potential enemy could exists and, in particular,
which are necessary and suﬃcient conditions that an enemy should satisfy to alter
the correct behavior of the whole system. In order to protect the system we may
simply check the correctness of each process X before it is executed or, if it is not
possible, we may deﬁne a controller that, in any case, forces each process to behave
correctly. We may distinguish several situations 9 depending on the control we may
have on the process X:
(i) if X performs an action we may detect and intercept it;
(ii) in addition to (i), it is possible to know which are the possible next steps of X;
(iii) X whole code is known and we are able to model check it 10 .
In the scenarios (i) and (ii) we may imagine to develop some controllers that force
the intruder to behave correctly, i.e., as prescribed by the formula φ//S,\H .
3.1 Synthesis of controller programs
We wish to provide a framework where we are able to enforce speciﬁc security
properties deﬁning a new operator, said Y 
∗ X, that can permit to control the
behavior of the target X, given the behavior of a control program Y . We can image
diﬀerent behaviors for controller operators. For instance in [21,22] security automata
deﬁned in [6,29] are modeled by process algebra operators. These operators permit
to enforce safety properties as the automata they model. Here we develop a theory
for enforcing also information ﬂow properties, speciﬁed as tBNDC, and we give
some examples of controllers that do this.
First of all we note that, by introducing a controller operator the Formula (2)
becomes
∃Y ∀X (S‖Y 
∗ X)\H |= φ (4)
Equivalently, by pmc, we get:
∃Y ∀X (Y 
∗ X) |= φ′ where φ′ = φ//(S\H) (5)
While the Formula (5) should be the property to manage, it might not be easy.
Considering the following additional assumption:
Assumption 3.1 For every X and Y , we have: Y 
∗ X ≈t Y .
If the controller operator satisﬁes the Assumption 3.1, the Formula (5) is equivalent
to:
∃Y Y |= φ′ (6)
As a matter of fact, the previous assumption permits us to conclude that Y 
∗X and
Y are timed equivalent. It is possible to reduce the Formula (5) to the Formula (6) by
resorting to the concept of characteristic formula for timed equivalence (Deﬁnition
2.6).
9 The last two pose several decidability issues.
10We do not consider here the possibility of manipulating the code.
I. Matteucci / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 186 (2007) 101–120 111
It is important to note that the Assumption 3.1 is a suﬃcient condition to enforce
some properties and in particular to enforce tBNDC (although in the scenario (i)
it would not be very useful, since it could often override the high user instructions).
To force tBNDC we have also to require not only that Y satisﬁes the formula φ′
but also that is weakly time alive. Since the w.t.a. property can be expressed by a
μ-calculus formula, φw.t.a. for short, we have to ﬁnd a model for φ
′ ∧ φw.t.a. = φ
′′.
While designing such a process Y could not be diﬃcult in principle, we can take
advantage of our logical approach and obtain an automated procedure. As matter
of facts, exploiting the Theorem 2.4, it is possible to decide if there exists a model
Y for φ′′ and ﬁnd it. For the semantics of conjunction, if Y satisﬁes φ′′ it satisﬁes φ.
Hence Y is suitable for Formula (6). Unfortunately, the satisﬁability procedure has
complexity that is, in the worst case, exponential in the size of the formula. Hence,
since we express security property by a formula, in the worst case, the procedure to
ﬁnd Y has exponential complexity.
3.2 Example of controller operators
In this section we give two examples of possible semantics deﬁnition of a controller
operator.
Let E and F be two processes. We deﬁne the controller operator 
′ by the
following rules.
(a)
E
α
→ E′ F
α
→ F ′
E 
′ F
α
→ E′ 
′ F ′
α 	= τ (b)
E
a
→ E′
E 
′ F
a
→ E′ 
′ F
(c)
F
τ
→ F ′
E 
′ F
τ
→ E 
′ F ′
This operator forces the system to make always the right action also if we do not
know what action the agent X is going to perform. Whereas we are interested
to the observational equivalence between processes, X can also perform the action
τ . Under this hypothesis and the additional one that X is weakly time alive,
this controller operator is able to wait an action of a possible intruder, then, after
timeout 11 expires, performs the right action. It is possible to note that 
′ is tick-
deterministic (the action tick can be performed only if the rule (a) can be applied.).
Proposition 3.1 Let E and F be two ﬁnite-state processes. If both E and F are
weakly time alive, also E 
′ F is weakly time alive.
Proposition 3.2 The operator 
′ enjoys Assumption 3.1.
Another controller operators 
′′ can be deﬁned as follows.
(a)
E
α
→ E′ F
α
→ F ′
E 
′′ F
α
→ E′ 
′′ F ′
α 	= τ (b)
E
a
→ E′ F
a
	⇒ F ′
E 
′′ F
a
→ E′ 
′′ F
(c)
F
τ
→ F ′
E 
′′ F
τ
→ E 
′′ F ′
11Referring to [14] the notion of timeout can be formally deﬁned through the combination of process algebra
operators
I. Matteucci / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 186 (2007) 101–120112
This operator looks at the action performed by F and, if E and F perform the
same action α then the whole system performs it. On the contrary, the whole
system performs the action performed by E. The τ action can be always performed
by both of the processes. This controller is tick-deterministic and we can prove the
following propositions.
Proposition 3.3 Let E and F be two ﬁnite-state processes. If both E and F are
weakly time alive, also E 
′′ F is weakly time alive.
Proposition 3.4 The operator 
′′ enjoys Assumption 3.1.
3.2.1 Feasibility issues for our controllers
The introduction of a controller operator helps to guarantee a correct behavior of
the entire system.
We discuss in this section the feasibility of our controller operators, i.e. how and
also if, these controllers 
′, 
′′, can be implemented.
For the ﬁrst controller operator, 
′, we can note that it may in any moment
neglect the external agent X behavior, unless X performs τ . The behavior of the
system may simply follow the behavior of the controller process. In particular,
the controller may always choose to perform its correct action, rather than waiting
for an action by the target. Thus, it would be easily implementable in all three
scenarios.
The operator 
′′ cannot be implemented in the scenario (i): if we are not able
to decide a priori which are possible next steps that the external agent is going
to perform we cannot implement the second rule of (11). In the scenario (ii) 
′′
operator would be implementable. It would be also possible in this scenario to give
priority to the ﬁrst rule in order to allow always the correct action of the target.
Thus, controller 
′′ would be our favorite, if we could consider scenario (ii) because
it leaves that the external agent executes correct action, if the ﬁrst rule can be
applied, and denies the unwanted situation checking hem by the second rule. Also
in this case internal actions performed by X are permitted without any action of
Y .
3.3 Composition of properties
Our logical approach is able to struggle successfully with composition problems. If
we should force many diﬀerent security policies, we have only to force the conjunc-
tion of them. In formulas: let φ1, · · · , φn be n diﬀerent security policies, S be our
system and X be a target, we have:
∀X(S‖X)\H |= φ1 . . . ∀X(S‖X)\H |= φn
Hence, for all X the system (S‖X)\H have to satisfy φi for i = 1, . . . , n. This is
equivalent to satisfy the conjunction of these,
∧
i=1,··· ,n φi = φ. Hence the problem
is reduced to:
∀X(S‖X)\H |= φ (7)
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that is the same situation that we have described by the Formula (5).
3.4 Analysis of parameterized systems
A parameterized system describes an inﬁnite family of (typically ﬁnite-state) sys-
tems; instances of the family can be obtained by ﬁxing parameters. Consider a
parameterized system S = Pn deﬁned by parallel composition of processes P , e.g.
P‖P‖ . . . ‖P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. The parameter n represents the number of processes P present in the
system S.
Example 3.5 Consider the system with one consumer process C and n producer
processes P . Each process P is deﬁned P
def
= a.P where a ∈ Act, and the process
C is a¯.C. The entire system is (Pn‖C)\{a} and the processes communicate by
synchronization on a¯ and a actions.
Referring to the Formula (2) we have
∀n ∀X Pn‖X |= φ (8)
It is possible to note that in the previous equation there are two universal quanti-
ﬁcations; the ﬁrst one on the number of instances of the process P and the second
one on the possible unknown agents.
In order to eliminate the universal quantiﬁcation on the number of processes,
ﬁrst of all, we deﬁne the concept of invariant formula w.r.t. partial model checking
for parallel operator as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.6 A formula φ is said an invariant w.r.t. partial model checking for
the system P‖X iﬀ φ ⇔ φ//P .
It is possible to prove the following result.
Proposition 3.7 Given the system ∀i Pi‖X. If φ is an invariant formula for this
system then
∀X (∀n Pn‖X |= φ iﬀ X |= φ)
In order to apply the theory developed in Section 3.1, we show a method to ﬁnd
the invariant formula. According to [5], let ψi be deﬁned as follows
ψi =
⎧⎨
⎩
φ′1 if i = 1
ψi−1 ∧ φ
′
i if i > 1
By deﬁnition of ψi and by Lemma 2.5, ∀j s.t. 1 ≤ j ≤ i (X |= φ
′
j) ⇔ X |= ψi.
Hence X |= ψi means that ∀j s.t. 1 ≤ j ≤ i Pj‖X |= φ
′. We say that ψi is said to
be contracting if ψi ⇒ ψi−1. If ∀i ψi ⇒ ψi−1 holds, we have a chain that is a said
a contracting sequence. If it is possible to ﬁnd the invariant formula ψω for a chain
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of μ-calculus formulae, that is also said limit of the sequence, then the following
identity holds.
∀X X |= ψω ⇔ ∀n ≥ 1 Pn‖X |= φ
′ (9)
Now we can apply the reasoning made in Section 3.1. Hence we are able to deﬁne
a controller operator that forces each process to behave correctly and synthesize a
controller program.
In some cases it could not be possible to ﬁnd the limit of the chain. However
there are some technique that can be useful in order to ﬁnd an approximation of
this limit (see [5,9]).
4 A simple example
Consider the process S = l.0+h.h.l.0. The system S where no high level activity is
present is timed weakly bisimilar to l.0. Consider the following equational deﬁnition
(please note that XS is a variable here):
XS =ν ([τ ]XS) ∧ [l]T ∧ 〈〈l〉〉T
It asserts that a process may and must perform the visible action l. As for the
study of tBNDC-like properties we can apply the partial evaluation for the parallel
operator we obtain after some simpliﬁcations:
(XS)//S =ν ([τ ](XS)//S) ∧ [h]〈〈h〉〉T
which, roughly, expresses that after performing a visible h action, the system reaches
a conﬁguration s.t. it must perform another visible h action. The information
obtained through partial model checking can be used to enforce a security policy
which prevents a system from having certain information leaks. In particular, if we
use the deﬁnition of the controller as 
′′, we simply need to ﬁnd a process that is
a model for the previous formula, say Y = h.h.0. Then, for any component X, we
have (S‖(Y 
′′ X)) \ {h} satisﬁes (XS)//S .
For instance, consider X = h.0. The system
(S‖(Y 
′′ X)) \ {h}
τ
−→ (h.l.0‖(h 
′′ 0)) \ {h}
Thus, using the second rule the controller may force to issue another h and thus we
eventually get
(h.l.0‖(h 
′′ 0)) \ {h}
τ
−→ (l.0‖(0 
′′ 0)) \ {h} ≈ l.0
and so the system still preserves its security since the actions performed by the
component X have been prevented from being visible outside. On the contrary, if
the controller would not be there would be a deadlock after the ﬁrst internal action.
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5 Discussion on related work
In [19], a preliminary work has been provided that is based on diﬀerent techniques
for automatically synthesizing systems enjoying a very strong security property, i.e.,
SBSNNI (see [12]). That work did not deal with controllers.
Much of prior works are about the study of enforceable properties and related
mechanisms. In [11] authors deal with a safety interface that permits to study
if a module is safe or not in a given environment. Here is checked all system,
instead in our approach, through the partial model checking function, we are able
to monitor only the necessary/untrusted part of the system. This is an advantage
of our approach because often not all the system need to be checked (or it is simply
not convenient to check it as a whole). Some components could be trusted and one
would like to have a method to constrain only the untrusted ones (e.g. downloaded
applets). Similarly, it could not be possible to build a reference monitor for a
whole distributed architecture, while it could be possible to have it for some of its
components.
Schneider in [29] deals with enforcement mechanisms able to enforce safety prop-
erties. Ligatti and al. in [6,16] have described four diﬀerent kinds of security auto-
mata. In these articles there is the idea that safety properties can be enforced and
information ﬂow cannot. Starting from these works, in [21,22] security automata
have been modeled by process algebra operators. Exploiting satisﬁability procedure
for μ-calculus and results of process algebra theory, authors are able to synthesize
appropriate controller program for a given controller operator. Our work represents
an extension of [21,22] because here we enforce also information ﬂow properties.
Moreover we study parameterized systems and all the theory is developed for a
timed setting.
Also in their paper, Bartoletti, Degano and Ferrari (see [4]) refer to [29] saying
that while safety properties can be enforced by an execution monitor, liveness prop-
erties cannot. In this paper they deal with the problem of modeling composition
of services in the presence of security constraints. In this paper is presented typed
extension of the λ-calculus in order to describe services as program expressions, and
to compose them under security constraints. In order to enforce safety and liveness
properties, they enclose security-critical code in policy framings, in particular safety
framings and liveness framings, that enforce respectively safety and liveness proper-
ties of execution histories. The analysis is a static analysis that over-approximates
behavior history expressions.
We use controller synthesis in order to force a system to verify security policy.
The synthesis of controllers is, however, studied also in other research areas. We
describe here two papers that deal with synthesize of controller in real-time. In [10]
the author describes an algorithm for synthesize controller from real-time speciﬁc-
ation. He presents an algorithm for speciﬁed in a subset of the internal temporal
logic duration calculus. The synthesized controllers are given as PLC-Automata.
These are an abstract representation of a machine that periodically polls the input
and has the possibility of measuring time. In [26] the authors tackle the following
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problem: given a timed automaton restrict its transition relation in a systematic
way so that all remaining behaviors satisfy certain properties. The problem is for-
mulated using the notion of real-time game. A strategy for a given game is a rule
that tells the controller how to choose between several possible actions in any game
position. A strategy is winning if the controller, by following these rules, always
wins (according to a given deﬁnition of winning) no matter what the environment
does. There is the deﬁnition of game automata and the authors gives a relation
and, by using it, it is able to deﬁne a winning strategy for the game. We are going
to study the relationship with our approach.
6 Conclusion and Future Works
We illustrated some results towards a uniform theory for enforcing security proper-
ties based on a process calculi and logical formalization of security properties.
With this work, we contribute to extend a framework based on process calculi
and partial model checking that has been shown to be very suitable to specify and
verify security properties also to the synthesis of secure systems also in a timed
setting.
We give a technique to enforce information ﬂow properties by using process
algebra controller operators. As a matter of fact we ﬁnd out suﬃcient conditions
to enforce some properties as tBNDC. However, as the Assumption 3.1, is strong
we are working to reﬁne our method in order to deal with problem.
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A Technical proofs
Lemma 2.9 Let E be a ﬁnite-state process and let φE,	t be its characteristic formula
w.r.t. weak simulation. Let F be a ﬁnite-state process s.t. F t E. We have
E |= φE,	t ⇔ F |= φE,	t.
Proof: In order to prove the following proposition we give the following chain:
F t E ⇔ ∀αF
α
→ F ′∃E′E
α
⇒ E′ ∧ F ′ t E
′ ⇔
∀αF
α
→ F ′ ⇒ F ′ |=
∨
XE′ ⇔ ∀αF |= [α]
∨
XE′ ⇔
F |=
∧
([α](
∨
XE′))

Proposition 3.1 Let E and F be two ﬁnite-state processes. If both E and F are
weakly time alive, also E 
′ F is weakly time alive.
Proof: We want to prove that for all (E 
′ F )′ ∈ Der(E 
 F ) (E 
′ F )′
tick
⇒ . E and
F are weakly time alive so
• for all E′ ∈ Der(E) E′
tick
⇒ i.e., E′
τ∗
→ E1
tick
→ E′′
τ∗
→
• for all F ′ ∈ Der(F ) F ′
tick
⇒ i.e., F ′
τ∗
→ F1
tick
→ F ′′
τ∗
→
So ∃E′, F ′ such that (E 
′ F )′ = E′ 
′ F ′ and, referring to the semantics rules of 
′
E′ 
′ F ′
τ∗
→ E′ 
′ F1
τ
→ E1 

′ F1
tick
→ E′′ 
′ F ′′
τ∗
→ 
Proposition 3.2 The operator 
′ enjoys Assumption 3.1
Proof : We have to prove the following sentence:
For every E exists an F such that: E 
′ F ≈t E.
In order to do that, we show that the following relation is a timed weak bisimulation:
R = {(E 
′ F,E) | E,F ∈ E and F is weakly time alive}
We distinguish two cases: action a and the action tick.
• Assume that (E 
′ F,E) ∈ R and (E 
′ F )
a
→ (E 
′ F )′. According to given
semantics rules, if the ﬁrst rule is applied (E 
′ F )′ = E′ 
′ F ′. Looking at
premises of the rule guarantees that exists E
a
⇒ E′. If the second rule is applied
(E 
′ F )′ = E′ 
′ F . Also in this case in premises there is E
a
⇒ E′. If F performs
the action τ (E 
′ F )′ = E
′ F ′. Since we have the reﬂexive and transitive closure
of
τ
→, E′ = E by the action τ .
Assume that (E,E 
′ F ) ∈ R and E
a
→ E′. Using a) rule or b) rule of 
′, we
can have two diﬀerent options for (E 
′ F )′. In both cases exists (E 
′ F )′ s.t.
(E 
′ F )
a
⇒ (E 
′ F )′ and (E′, (E 
′ F )′) ∈ R. It is possible to note that in this
case τ does not produce any problem.
• Assume that (E 
′ F,E) ∈ R and (E 
′ F )
tick
→ E′ 
′ F ′. We can note that this
transition is possible by application of the ﬁrst rule, i.e., E
tick
→ E′ and F
tick
→ F ′.
So we have obviously E′ such that E
tick
⇒ E′.
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Assume that (E,E 
′F ) ∈ R and E
tick
→ E′. We have to prove that exists (E
′F )′
such that (E 
′ F )
tick
⇒ (E 
′ F )′. Considering that F is weakly time alive, we
consider, without loss of generality, that F
tick
→ F ′ 12 . Applying the ﬁrst rule we
obtain E′ 
′ F ′.
Proposition 3.3 Let E and F be two ﬁnite-state processes. If both E and F are
weakly time alive, also E 
′′ F is weakly time alive.
Proof: It is the same proof of the proposition 3.1. 
Proposition 3.4 The operator 
′′ enjoys Assumption 3.1.
Proof:We have to prove the following sentence:
For every E exists an F such that: E 
′′ F ≈t E. In order to do that, we show that
the following relation is a timed weak bisimulation:
R = {(E 
′′ F,E) | E,F ∈ E and F is weakly time alive}
With similar arguments of the proof of proposition 3.2, we can prove that E
′′F ≈t
E.
12 In fact, being F w.t.a. we know that for all F ′ ∈ Der(F ) F ′
tick
=⇒. This means that F may perform a τ
action a certain number of time. This is not a problem because it is suﬃcient to apply the third rule of ′′
as much time as the number of τ actions performed.
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